Lt. Mingenbach's Statement
Did Lt. Mingenbach hear Lt. Moncla's voice on radio?It was through the efforts of Michigan UFO investigator, John Tenney that most of the missing documents from the Official USAF Kinross Accident Investigation Report were finally obtained. Probably the most interesting new information to be revealed in the previously classified documents was contained in the statement and testimony of Lt. Bill Mingenbach.
On the night of the F-89 disappearance, Lt. Mingenbach was the pilot for the second crew which was on five minute alert status at Kinross when the scramble horn blasted. I talked by phone to Lt. Mingenbach, and he revealed that at the time of the horn, the two standby crews on fifteen minute alert status had just returned from dinner and they were actually about to relieve the two crews on five minute alert.
I had also talked with Lt. Moncla's widow when I was visiting Louisiana in the fall of 2002. She told me that the crews had been playing cards before the alert horn sounded. By her account, just before Lt. Moncla left the ready room to respond to the alert, he placed his wallet on the table.
After Moncla and Wilson took off, Mingenbach and his radar observer left the alert hangers for dinner. When he returned from dinner at 7:00 PM EST Lt. Mingenbach called Naples (GCI radar station at Sault Ste. Marie) requesting a C.A.P. (Civil Aviation Patrol) mission. The mission was immediately approved and Lt. Mingenbach and his radar operator were airborne at 7:15 PM EST. After he was airborne, Naples assigned a route vector out over Lake Superior and Mingenbach was informed that contact had been lost with Moncla and Wilson. For the remainder of their mission, Mingenbach's radar observer made continuous attempts to contact Moncla and Wilson by radio on all channels. At about 7:35 PM EST, Mingenbach and his radar observer heard a brief radio transmission on channel 10. Both crew members believed the voice in the transmission was that of Lt. Moncla, who they recognized by his pronounced slow southern drawl. The transmission was only a few seconds duration and sounded like an accidental transmission of perhaps something he was saying to his radar observer. In his oral testimony to the investigation board, Mingenbach stated his recall was the message was "I think we better" followed by several other words he could not recall. They tried to contact the originating voice several times on the channel but received no response.
It is very strange for the pilots to receive an unidentified transmission on a military frequency with no response. It is stranger still to consider the fact that both crew members identified the voice as that of Lt. Moncla who they both recognized by his accent and delivery. This is especially mysterious when one considers that the transmission was at least half an hour after radar and radio contact had been lost with the F-89. It must be remembered that indications are that several radar stations had been observing the F-89 intercept and so it is very hard to attribute this lost signal to anything other than the crash or disappearance of the F-89. The loss of radar contact with the F-89 implies one of perhaps two possibilities:
The simultanteous loss of the IFF signal and radar return from the F-89 indicates it had crashed into the lake. There had previously been some radio communications problems with the F-89 during the flight and perhaps the communications had failed again, preventing the transmission of a distress before the F-89 crashed. If the radio message was from Lt. Moncla, the pilot could not have been transmitting from a crashed plane in the lake and if he were, it would most certainly have been with greater urgency, perhaps something like "MAYDAY – Avenger Red is down." A second possibility might be that the message was previously recorded and replayed.
The F-89 had not crashed but was instead captured by the craft it had been sent to intercept and had been observed to merge with on radar. This theory is based on a theoretical framework that allows for the possibility that some UFOs are perhaps as they sometimes appear to be – advanced craft of possible extraterrestrial origin. Some UFOs are described as enormous "motherships" which can deploy other smaller "scout disks" from on board landing bays or hangers. Theoretically it might be possible for the ETs piloting these craft to gain control of the F-89's control system or to use other technology to draw the craft into an open bay, normally used for one of the scout craft. This theory allows for the possibility that Moncla and Wilson were captured and still alive within the alien mothership. The radio transmission was perhaps not made realtime but was previously recorded during the final moments of the intercept when Lt. Moncla observed the alien mothership and was telling his radar observer "I think we better start heading back" – followed a few seconds later by "my control stick isn't working, try yours". The cockpit transmission was recorded by the aliens and rebroadcast later for a purpose. Perhaps as a warning to the USAF to cease in some of the more aggressive pursuits which at times allegedly involved the deployment of weapons systems against the flying saucers.
In presenting these two scenarios, I am not discounting any other possible theory, but I do think these contrast the two scenarios I propose as being of greatest possible significance.
The following links present the information contained in the USAF Official Accident Report that pertains to this discussion:
4 December 1953
S T A T E M E N T
Lt Moncla and I had been on five minute alert on Monday afternoon 23 November 1953. The fifteen minute crews came on at 1700, stayed until 1745 and then left for dinner. They returned about 1815, and were about to takeover 5 min from Moncla and I when the scramble horn blew once and Lt Moncla was airborne about 1820. My R.O. and I left the alert hangars for dinner at 1825, returned about 1900, and I called Naples requesting a C.A.P. mission. Permission was received immediately and we were airborne about 1915. I called Naples on channel 10 at 1918 and was told to vector 330 degrees, angels 20, assigned call of Avenger Black, informed that radio & radar contact had been lost with Avenger Red and to attempt contact with him on channel 10. Until I was told to return to home plate my R.O. made continuous attempt to contact with him on VHF channels I, 9, 10, 11, 1, and guard. During the climbout I encountered a broken ceiling at about 3000 feet, and subsequent layers of overcast to angels 20, where I requested an altitude change from GCI to angels 30. Permission granted I continued the climb and broke out above all clouds at angels 29. No icing encountered on climb. At about 1935, heading 330, altitude 25,000 my R.O. and I both believe we heard a short transmission from Avenger Red, recognizable as his voice, for about 5 seconds on channel 10. He seemed to be in the middle of a sentence when his transmission broke through, and therefore meaning was unintelligible. We called him back several times and received no reply. Shortly after this we were vectored 270, cruising at angels 30, and control was passed to Pillow.
My radio reception was very good, since I was clearly reading Naples vectoring Avenger Purple where I was 150 mi from home plate. Pillow vectored me over the area where contact had been lost by them with Avenger Red, and requested that I letdown in that area to investigate. Kinross weather had forecast moderate to heavy icing and snow showers for the local area, and since I was not sure that my anti icing system was operative, and did not have retractable engine screens, I hesitated to letdown into icing conditions that perhaps had given trouble to Avenger Red. Also snow showers combined with a low ceiling over the lake would have rendered effective search impossible in that area. I was informed that the request for me to letdown had come from Horsefly, and therefore Pillow nor Naples could do anything but have me orbit the area and continue to attempt radio contact with the lost aircraft. Finally, when Avenger Purple had come within 30 miles of my position, we were both told that Horsefly requested we return to home plate and land. A normal letdown at Kinross was accomplished under Naples control, light icing encountered between 17,000 and 6,000 feet, and I landed at 2055.
WILLIAM MINGENBACH
Lt., USAF
A02234770
AS CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
David C. Collins
DAVID C. COLLINS
Captain, USAF
Aircraft Accident Investigation Officer
23 November 1953 A/C NO 51-5853A Lt. Moncla
Lt. Mingenbach's Testimony
Aircraft F-89C SN 51-5853A
The Aircraft Accident Board convened on 5 December 1953 at 0930 at Kinross Air Force Base to determine the cause and make recommendations relative to the aircraft accident involving an F-89C SN 51-5853A piloted by 1st Lt. Felix E Mancla, Jr. AO 1858910, which disappeared on an active air defense mission.
The Aircraft Accident Board was established by S.O. 110, paragraph 8, dated 21 July 1953, Headquarters, 534th Air Defense Group as amended by S.O. 163, paragraph 3, dated 28 September 1953 and S.O. 164, paragraph 19, dated 29 September 1953.
The following members were present:
Major Harry H.. Caseleman . . . . . . . . President
Major Forrest F. Parham . . . . . . . . . Alternate President
Capt. David C. Collins . . . . . . . . . Aircraft Accident Investigating Officer
Capt. Harry Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . Member
Capt. Daniel W. Shea . . . . . . . . . . Medical Officer
The aircraft forms and the statements of the GCI Controller and Lt. Mingenback were reviewed and discussed by the board, and it was considered essential that Lt. Mingenback appear personnaly before the board to clarify the statement that he had possibly heard a radio transmission from Lt. Mancla while he was airborne approximately one hour after Lt. Mancla became airborne.
It was also considered essential to call on Lt. Stuart to clarify the times when radio contact was lost and when IF and radar contact were lost.
The board adjourned at 10:50 to be recalled at the request of the president.
The Aircraft Accident Board reconvened at 10:45, 8 December, 1953 at Kinross Air Force Base to determine the cause and make recommendations relative to the aircraft accident involving an F-89C SN 51-5853A piloted by 1st Lt. Felix E Moncla, Jr. AO 1858910, which disappeared on an active air defense mission.
The Aircraft Accident Board was established by S.O. 110, paragraph 8, dated 21 July 1953, Headquarters, 534th Air Defense Group as amended by S.O. 163, paragraph 3, dated 28 September 1953 and S.O. 164, paragraph 19, dated 29 September 1953.
The following members were present:
Major Harry H.. Caseleman . . . . . . . . President
Major Forrest F. Parham . . . . . . . . . Alternate President
Capt. David C. Collins . . . . . . . . . Aircraft Accident
Investigating Officer
Capt. Harry Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . Member
Capt. Daniel W. Shea . . . . . . . . . . Medical Officer
Additional leads uncovered during the later course of the investigation indicated that there might be a possibility that Lt. Mancla subjective to attacks of Vertigo in a little more than normal degree. Upon pursuing these leads, it was discovered that statements had been made by former members of Lt. Manclas organization but were not first hand evidence and were regarded as heresay. A statement was made by Lt. Mingenbach which related to a transmission made by the F-89 aircraft and, for these reasons his presence is requested at the accident board meeting today.
Lt. William A. Mingenback was called before the accident board and duly sworn in.
Q. State your full name, rank, serial number and organization.
A. William Alexander Mingenback, 2nd Lt. AO 2223270 433rd Fighter-Interceptor Squadron
Q. Lt. Mingenbach, do you identify the statement which I have just handed you as being a statement which you made?
A. Yes.
Q. You state about 1935 is when you heard this transmission. Are you certain about that time?
A. It is difficult to know whether it was 1935 or 1945; it may have been 1950.
Q. Are you sure about the 19th hour?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It's pretty certain it was the 19th hour?
A. I would say later than 1930 and earlier than 1950.
Q. You were airborne about 1915?
A. Yes sir, 50 minutes after Lt. Mancla was.
Q. Were you able to recognize any words or phrases that were spoken?
A. Sir, when the transmission came I believe I was saying something to my radar observer, therefore when I read this in the UHF I immediately stopped talking, but since my mind was on a different subject - I believe he said "I think we had better" and then several other words that I do not remember were stated. It was broke in after the sentence was started and cut out after it was finished. It sounded like an accidental transmission if it was transmitted by a weak transmitter it may have been on the air some time before I picked it up. When it came through, it was 3x3 or 4x4 full volume and clear.
Q. Are you sure it wasn't the control.
A. Sir, it was either Lt. Mancla or Lt. Nordeck. I questioned my radar observer later and he said it sounded like Lt. Mancla. It was a southern accent.
Q. The only reason why you think it could have been Mancla was due to the accent?
A. Yes sir, his voice was very recognizable on the radio. I had flown with him frequently in the past year. I believe I could recognize 85 or 90 percent of our squadron on the radio.
Q. You can't recall any of the words he said except "I think we better"?
A. Sir, that's all I could get out of it. If I thought hard enough, I might come up with an answer that might not be correct. I am not certain enough to make a positive and useful statement to anyone. I also want to emphasize that I am not positive it was his voice not so much as I thought it would be worthy of inclosure in my statement?
Q. You made this attempt to contact on UHF or VHF?
A. UHF
Q. Did it sound to you by the tone of his voice that it was a routine transmission to his radar observer or hurried or excited?
A. Gene was not liable to panic under any conditions. His voice did not seem excited. It was a normal transmission. It's hard to tell by just a short transmission. The words weren't hurried. He always speaks at the same rate of speed whether he is in a hurry or not, very close to his manner of speech.